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Further work on beacon-based excep-
tion analysis for multimissions (BEAM), a
method of real-time, automated diagnosis
of a complex electromechanical systems,
has greatly expanded its capability and
suitability of application. This expanded for-
mulation, which fully integrates physical
models and symbolic analysis, is described
architecturally in the figure.
In a typical application, BEAM takes the
form of an embedded software suite exe-
cuting onboard the system under study,
though many off-board data analysis
engines have been constructed as well.
The BEAM software performs real-time
fusion and analysis of all system observ-
ables. BEAM is intended to reduce the
burden of diagnostic data collection and
analysis currently performed by both
human operators and computers. In the
case of a spacecraft or aircraft, BEAM
enables onboard identification and charac-
terization of most anomalous conditions,
thereby making telemetry of larger quanti-
ties of sensor information to ground sta-
tions unnecessary. Previously BEAM has
been described in several prior NASA Tech
Briefs articles: “Reusable Software for
Autonomous Diagnosis of Complex
Systems” (NPO-20803) Vol. 26, No. 3
(March 2002), page 33; “Beacon-Based
Exception Analysis for Multimissions”
(NPO-20827), Vol. 26, No. 9 (September
2002), page 32; and “Wavelet-Based Real-
Time Diagnosis of Complex Systems”
(NPO-20830), Vol. 27, No. 1 (January
2003), page 67.
The new formulation of BEAM expands
upon previous advanced techniques for
analysis of signal data, utilizing mathemat-
ical modeling of the system physics, and
expert-system reasoning. These compo-
nents are integrated seamlessly, making
possible analysis of varied information
about the monitored system, including
time-correlated signal performance, state
information, software execution, operator
command execution, and convergence to
state and physical models. BEAM soft-
ware is highly adaptable and can be imple-
mented at relatively low cost in terms of
processor power and training, and does
not require special sensors. Unlike some
prior methods of automated diagnosis,
BEAM affords traceability of its conclu-
sions, which allows system experts to
completely reconstruct its decision path
for greater operator confidence or to aid
analysis of novel conditions. Principal
among BEAM’s strengths is its excellent
performance in detection and classification
of such novelty, meaning faults of previ-
ously unknown — and untrainable — type.
In the BEAM architecture, discrete sen-
sor information, state information, and
commands are fed as input to the sym-
bolic model, and quantitative sensor data
is input to a simplified physical model of
the system. These modules are designed
to leverage existing system models, which
can be high or low fidelity. The symbolic
model aids signal-based analysis in terms
of mode selection or other discrete out-
puts. The physical model improves sensi-
tivity through separation of predictable
and unpredictable signal components.
Time-varying quantities are analyzed in
two groups: (1) signals with a high degree
of correlation to others, or signals that are
not isolated in a diagnostic sense, are
passed to the coherence-analysis compo-
nent of BEAM; (2) signals that may unique-
ly indicate a fault, as well as those already
suspected to be faulty, are passed through
constructed from model carriers modulat-
ed by model C/A, and P (and, when applic-
able, A) codes.
Processing is said to be done in a code
mode when the receiver “knows” the code
in question. Because the C/A code is not
encrypted, C/A modulation is usually proc-
essed in the code mode, using the pub-
lished C/A code. Processing is said to be
done in an encryption mode when the
receiver does not “know” the code in ques-
tion. More specifically, processing is said to
be done in an encryption mode when the
receiver does not “know” the A code with
which the P code is modulated. Hence, the
present invention is characterized as a
method of encryption-mode processing.
The figure is a block diagram of signal
processing according to the invention. The
received GPS signal is down-converted
from radio frequency (RF) to baseband to
obtain two pairs of quadrature compo-
nents — one pair for L1, the other for L2.
Unlike in some prior methods, there is no
cross-processing of signals between the
L1 and L2 P channels. Instead, each of the
two quadrature components obtained from
each RF signal, independently of the other
components, is counterrotated with its
respective model phase, correlated with its
respective model P code, and then succes-
sively summed and dumped over pre-sum
intervals substantially coincident with chips
of the respective encryption code. In the
encryption mode, the effect of the unknown
A-code sign flips is reduced, for each quad-
rature component of each RF signal, by
combining selected pre-sums. The resulting
combined pre-sums are then summed and
dumped over longer intervals and further
processed to extract the amplitude, phase,
and delay for each RF signal. The precision
of the resulting phase and delay values is
approximately four times better than that
obtained from conventional cross-correla-
tion of the L1 and L2 P signals.
In comparison with prior encryption-
mode receivers, a receiver according to this
invention offers greater signal-to-noise ratios
for the L1 and L2 P signals, and greater pre-
cision in the phases and delays of these sig-
nals. Unlike the prior receivers, this receiver
offers the capability for separate and inde-
pendent tracking of the L1 and L2 P signals
to eliminate fading crossover, separate and
independent measurement of the L1 and L2
P amplitudes, the option of dual-band mea-
surements without a separate L1 P channel,
removal of a half-cycle ambiguity in the L2 P
phase, and the option of operation in either
the code mode or the encryption mode with
maximum commonality of hardware and
software between modes. Finally, this pro-
cessing method would still work even if the
L1 and L2 P codes were to be encrypted
with different A codes.
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An algorithm computes the direction of
arrival (both azimuth and elevation angles)
of a lightning-induced electromagnetic sig-
nal from differences among the times of
arrival of the signal at four antennas in a Y-
shaped array on the ground. In the original
intended application of the algorithm, the
baselines of the array are about 90 m long
and the array is part of a lightning-detec-
tion-and-ranging (LDAR) system. The algo-
rithm and its underlying equations can also
be used to compute directions of arrival of
impulsive phenomena other than lightning
on arrays of sensors other than radio
antennas: for example, of an acoustic
pulse arriving at an array of microphones.
The underlying equations express the
differences among the times of arrival as
functions of the inner products of (1) the
unit vector of the direction of arrival and (2)
the unit vectors along the baselines of the
array. To obtain a solution for the unit vec-
tor (and thus, equivalently, the azimuth and
elevation angles) of the direction of arrival,
feature-extraction components. This split
allows BEAM to consider very complex
faults in the system, including interference
faults or miscommunication that escape
univariate detection methods, while retain-
ing robustness in poorly redundant sys-
tems or in the face of gross nonlinerity.
The components of BEAM described in
the figure are summarized as follows:
• The model filter combines sensor data
with predictions from a real-time physical
model. The inclusion of physical models,
where available, is the most efficient way
to incorporate domain knowledge into
signal-based data analysis.
• The symbolic data model interprets sta-
tus variables and commands to provide
an accurate, evolving picture of the sys-
tem mode and requested actions.
• The coherence-based fault detector
tracks the cobehavior of temporally vary-
ing quantities to expose changes in inter-
nal operating physics.
• The dynamical invariant anomaly detec-
tor tracks parameters of individual signals
to sense subtle deviations and predict
near-term behavior.
• The Informed Maintenance Grid (IMG)
studies evolution of cross-channel behav-
ior over the medium- and long-term oper-
ation of the system. It tracks consistent
subthreshold deviations and exposes
deterioration and loss of performance.
• The prognostic assessment yields a
forward projection of individual signals,
based upon their extracted parame-
ters. It also provides a useful short-
term assessment of impending faults
and loss of functionality.
• The causal system model is a rule-based
connectivity model designed to improve
isolation of fault sources and identifica-
tion of actor signals.
• The interpretation layer collates obser-
vations from all separate components
and submits a single fault report in a
format useable by recovery software,
planners or other AI software, and/or
human operators.
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This BEAM Architecture expands upon the original BEAM formulation in the following respects: (1) incorporation of physical models, (2) integration
of symbolic reasoning components, (3) statistical and stochastic modeling of individual signals (augmenting or supplanting prior wavelet-based mod-
eling), (4) trending to failure for individual signals and cross-signal features, and (5) enumeration of results using an expert system.
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